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Abstract
The article argues that polycentric and polyphonic basic principles of pluralist 
navigation are always needed as balancing tools to preserve sensitivity and awareness of 
agile agency of various legal, social and religious stakeholders to allow situation-specific 
forms of navigation. Clearly, this does not mean that ‘anything goes’, but demands 
that complex hybrid solutions have to be sought. Obviously states must retain a right 
to determine responsibly how their respective national identity and legal order should 
develop in conditions, nowadays, of intense pluralist challenges posed by increasingly 
diverse demographic structures. Especially the presence of many people in the Nordic 
countries who are Muslims, may have strong links to other legal orders, and feel 
connected to a religion that they value as part of their own life and identity while also 
claiming the right to be Danish, Finnish, Norwegian or Swedish, cannot be ignored.
Introduction: Changing demographic and religious landscapes 
in Europe and the involvement of Islam and Muslims
In this age of globalisation and legal pluralism (Michaels, 2009), it has become 
increasingly reductionist, and dangerous, to insist that ‘law’ or ‘religion’ as monist 
entities on their own can manage sustainably how we live together in Europe and 
construct multi-cultural societies and legal orders that do not violate basic rights of non-
majoritarian actors at different levels or scales. The challenges identified and discussed 
in this article  relate as much to the importance of what it means to be Islamic (Ahmed, 
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2016), modern challenges to Islamic law (Ali, 2016) as well as presumed challenges 
that Islam and Muslims pose, in virtually all European countries, to modalities of living 
together in peace and harmony. It has recently been argued that there is no necessary 
contradiction or conflict between secular modernity and liberalism on the one hand, 
and Islamic notions of the ‘good life’, on the other (Jamal, 2018). However, while it 
may be fairly easy to theorise this elegantly, in practice and lived reality significant 
challenges have arisen that do require much more sustained and informed debate 
and careful balancing of competing expectations. This article will illustrate these 
predicaments, but also the constructive possibilities, by focusing on the model of 
responsible law-related management through flying kites (Menski, 2011; 2013; 2014a, 
b; 2018a). 
While significant demographic changes are underway that appear to Islamise parts of 
Europe in new ways, it is evident that old and new conflicts and tensions of ‘law’ and 
‘religion’ continue to exist, in new contexts, so that much agile learning about skilful 
balancing of competing expectations has to be undertaken. Arguing with the help of 
the kite model that we always need alert navigation or, to use a different image, that it 
will be necessary to engage in bridge-building, stipulates up-front that the problems to 
be debated have to be seen as a complex interdisciplinary field of academic as well as 
practical analyses. This results in many hybrid forms of managing diversity at various 
levels and in different domains, of which many useful examples already exist. These 
especially illustrate how young Muslims in Europe are trying to navigate traditions, 
while also making change (Barylo, 2018). 
My academic work about kite-flying warns against ‘quick fixes’, but recognises that the 
various challenges, with goodwill and a constructive predisposition on all sides, can 
be overcome in efforts to harmonise normative pluralism and human rights (Topidi, 
2018). However, if there are bad intentions and destructive agenda, then reasoned 
debate and calm balancing may simply become impossible, and we fall victim to terror 
and chaos. Hence, this article also warns states and law makers that ignoring the existing 
plurality of voices and perceptions and pushing through any particular narrow and 
nationalistic perspective may result in violence and wanton destruction. Such disaster 
scenarios confirm the limits of law in regulating highly contested issues simply through 
imposition of state-centric legal regulation and purportedly liberal reliance on human 
rights arguments that simply treat socio-cultural and religious traditions, whether of 
Muslims or other minorities, as completely intolerable. As Europeans, we might know 
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a lot about freedom and basic rights, but ignoring voices from all over the world, and 
especially the Global South, in debates about Islam and Europeanisation, seems short-
sighted. Simplistic images of ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ reflect power structures that legal 
pluralist navigation needs to scrutinise if we want to learn lessons from history. Most 
recent developments in reaction to the murder of a history teacher in France in late 
2020, sadly, reinforce this point.
In post-World War II Europe, there were few Muslims, but many ‘others’. Meanwhile, 
increasing international migration and much ethnic and religious global pluralisation 
has become a fact, which pans out in very different ways into local realities, sometimes 
with tensions, but also with much multi-cultural mixing. Along with this, the increasing 
presence of Muslims and of Islamic law in Europe has become a hugely important issue, 
so that new questions about ‘law’ and ‘religion’ and especially state law and Islamic 
normativities constantly arise. In highly diverse ways, thus, the situation-specificity 
of ‘law’ as a global phenomenon (Allott, 1980) has constantly been reconfigurated, 
and some parts of Europe have experienced intense plurification of law itself, too. 
For example, many British and German judges are busy, all the time, with handling 
cases involving Muslim law and a variety of foreign national legal systems. Private 
international law has experienced significant growth, but of course the law-related 
actions of Muslims in European jurisdictions (except certain parts of Greece) are not 
formally recognised as ‘law’. This scenario has inter alia led to new tensions about 
where and how to draw the boundaries between private and public spheres, raising also 
important questions about who should adapt to whom?  Should migrants from different 
countries and their descendants simply follow the law, so that the old Latin phrase 
‘cuius regio eius religio’ gets new meanings? Or to what extent should legal orders adapt 
to social and religious diversities caused by globalising forms of demographic change. 
In British discussions, Modood (1992) suggested early on that it was ‘[n]ot easy being 
British’, and in 2010 found in a new study that it was ‘[s]till not easy being British’. 
The highly experienced social anthropologist Roger Ballard (1994), based on intense 
ethnographic studies over many years, developed a model of ‘skilled cultural navigation’ 
among Asian immigrants in Britain, also in terms of religion, and taught that Britain’s 
Asian minorities have become an integral part of the British social order, but ‘they have 
done so on their own terms’ (Ballard, 1994: 8, emphasis in the original). Detailed legal 
studies during the same period observed the unofficial emergence of hybrid forms of 
British Muslim law or ‘Angrezi Shariat’ (Pearl and Menski, 1998: 116). Subsequent 
developments have not contradicted that pattern, and have rather strengthened and 
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further diversified it, as various kinds of British Muslims are still engaged, in numerous 
ways, in navigating the co-existence of English state law and their respective Muslim 
personal laws, which they brought with them to their new European home, or passed 
on to the next generation(s) in various ways. 
My own academic work over several decades, including participation as an expert, 
mainly on South Asian Muslim laws before courts in many cases, has taught me to 
identify some key challenges apart from falling victim to simple reductionist concepts 
of ‘law’ and ‘religion’, and specifically ‘Islam’. Before I come to the kite model and 
various strategies of navigating diversities and pluralities, I briefly illustrate that as 
a result of global migration movements, which have clearly also affected Nordic 
countries, demographic realities have changed entire local landscapes. This has posed 
challenges not only to state legal systems, but especially, though often far less visibly, 
to regional and local authority laws, for example in the domain of planning laws. As 
such developments have happened haphazardly and unevenly and are often taking local 
authorities by surprise, they can only be inadequately regulated on a local case-by-case 
basis, rather than forming a firm body of national policy. The UK often employed 
interventionist policies of dispersal for specific ethnic or religious minorities when they 
arrived. The resulting and highly diverse settlement patterns, but also concentrations of 
ethnic minority populations despite attempted dispersal, challenge both state authorities 
and the various Muslim communities. 
My experience is that many scholars in the academic disciplines concerned with such 
developments lack ethnographic curiosity or the necessary skills to follow up and map 
such changes. As a result, they struggle to assess demographic and religious change, 
which is complex, fast and often takes many hidden dimensions. A most impressive 
documentation of the unofficial status of Islam and Muslims, is provided in the eye-
opening pictoral collection presented by Degiorgis (2014), showing Hidden Islam in 
Islamic ‘makeshift’ places of worship all over Northeast Italy in 2009 to 2014. This 
study in effect demonstrates the desire of the Italian state, as well as the more or less 
silent consent of Muslim communities, to maintain an invisible bridge between the 
Italian state and the increasing numbers of Muslim residents by rendering evidence of 
Muslim religious activity invisible to outsiders. To what extent such invisibility is partly 
a defining phenomenon of Islam in Europe today would be important to research, for a 
few showy and prominent mosques in major cities clearly do not convey the full picture 
of the lively practice of European Islam today. 
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Moreover, there has been, and continues to be, huge mobility of Muslims (and other 
minorities) not only into Europe, but within Europe. Thus, many Danish Pakistani 
and Somali Muslims have been moving to the UK, and tens of thousands of Somalis 
have come from all over Europe to settle in the UK, maybe an unmentioned aspect of 
the current BREXIT agonies that nobody even dares to raise in public. That is then 
matched by continuing deliberate official ignorance over who these foreign Muslims 
are that have come to Europe. For example, the British Census, so far, does not count 
Somalis as a separate category, with the result that we have wildly differing estimates of 
that specific population, which is almost entirely Muslim, but may also self-identify as 
Middle-Eastern or African. Similarly, in the UK most Pakistanis, as only some experts 
seem to (want to) know, are actually Kashmiris, and among Turks in Germany, there 
are very many Kurds. In Norway, I found that many of the Pakistani Muslims are 
actually Ahmadis, members of a particular sect that are, in Pakistan, not even allowed 
to call themselves Muslims. Here, too, we see that the highly contested balancing of 
internal diversities within Muslim communities in Europe raises challenges that must 
not be ignored, especially since, as was also discussed during the conference, it remains 
impossible to identify who should be speaking to the respective Nordic state on behalf 
of Muslims.
While I am German and studied in Germany, I am actually much more familiar 
with developments in the UK. As part of my MA studies at the University of Kiel, I 
produced a map of the entire UK which shows the county-wise distribution of ethnic 
minorities on the basis of the 1971 Census figures in Britain. At that early postcolonial 
time, place of birth was the core census criterion, which was not actually very helpful 
in identifying specific ethnic or religious criteria. For example, persons identified in 
the 1971 Census as being born in what was then Muslim-dominated Pakistan might 
actually be Hindu or Sikh refugees that fled to India in 1947. They could even be 
descendants of British colonial officers born abroad while their parents served the 
Crown. And in summer 1971 this still included all persons born in what today is 
Muslim-dominated Bangladesh. Similarly, many Asian persons born in East African 
countries would actually be counted as East African, among whom there are also many 
Muslims. The British Census only introduced a specific, non-compulsory question 
about religion in 2001. 
The national picture of the UK regarding ethnic minority settlement and religion is 
remarkable in several respects. It shows the reality of a multicultural Britain already in 
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1971, concentrated in certain central and mostly urbanised parts of the country, right 
up to Glasgow and Edinburgh, and of course in London, while Britain’s peripheral 
regions were still almost completely ‘white’. If such a map were to be drawn today, based 
on the 2011 Census, one would definitely see an intensification of the multicultural 
central areas, and also a significant pluralisation of many more peripheral and originally 
‘white’ areas. Nationally, Britain almost had a Muslim Prime Minister, Sajid Javid, in 
summer 2019, before Boris Johnson gained power. Notably, London has for some years 
now had a Muslim mayor, Sadiq Khan, and many smaller local authorities in the UK 
have prominent Muslim leaders and numerous Muslim local councillors. 
The place that I know best and where I have my ear to the ground, the well-known 
multi-cultural city of Leicester, is famous for its football team (which also has some 
Muslim players), but also because of its so-called Golden Mile of Asian shops which 
even attracts customers from Nordic countries, as I found already in the 1970s. A local 
council survey in 1983 counted 12.436 Muslims in the city, in a total population of just 
under 300,000. Of note here was the ethnic diversity of these Muslims, since 11,614 
were identified as ‘Asian’, 383 as ‘Other’, 332 as ‘White’, and 107 as ‘West Indian’. 
Since the 1980s, much Muslim in-migration has been seen in Leicester, and more recent 
Census figures tell the remarkable story of gradual Islamisation of the local population 
in this central English city. Below, I first report the national picture and then focus on 
the city of Leicester.
The British Census figures for 2001 on religion, then counted by the Census for the 
first time, identified for the whole UK a Christian population of 42.079 million (71.6 
per cent), but already then 9.104 million people (15.5 per cent) claimed to have no 
religion, and another 4.289 million (7.3 per cent) did not state their religion. The 2001 
Census also counted 1.591 million Muslims (2.7 per cent), as well as 559.000 Hindus 
(1.0 per cent) and 336.000 Sikhs (0.6 per cent). The corresponding Census figures 
for 2011 show a significant decline of the Christian population to 33.2 million (59.3 
per cent), further growth of the presumably ‘secular’ population claiming to have no 
religion to 14.1 million (25.1 per cent), while slightly less people than in 2001, namely 
4.1 million (7.2 per cent) did not state their religion. Muslims had by 2011 increased to 
2.7 million (5.0 per cent), Hindus to 817.000 (1.5 per cent), and Sikhs to 423.000 (0.8 
per cent).
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The corresponding figures for Leicester confirm how internally diverse and complex 
one of Europe’s globally known most diverse cities has now become. Leicester had 
a population of 279.921 in 2001, with far less Christians than average for the UK, 
just 125.187 persons (44.7 per cent), while even more people than elsewhere claimed 
to have no religion, namely 48.789 persons (17.4 per cent), and another 19.785 
persons (7.0 per cent) did not state their religion. In 2001, Leicester was still a Hindu-
dominated city when we look at ethnic minority religions, with 41.248 Hindus (14.7 
per cent), 30.885 (11.0 per cent) Muslims, and 11.796 (4.2 per cent) Sikhs. The 2011 
Census figures for Leicester are intriguing, as the city population had grown to 329.839 
persons, of whom now only 106.872 (32.4 per cent) identified as Christians, 75.280 
persons (22.8 per cent) claimed to have no religion, and only 18.345 persons (5.6 per 
cent) did not state their religion. Most significantly, Islam was now Leicester’s largest 
ethnic minority religion, with 61.440 Muslims (18.6 per cent), while Hindus had 
grown to 50.087 persons (15.2 per cent) and there were 14.457 Sikhs (4.4 per cent) in 
2011. 
This city has now almost 100 mosques, many of whom are purpose-built and quite 
prominent. There are also many more places for Muslim religious and educational 
activities, including many Koran schools (madrasah) and several Muslim state schools. 
A significant case arose in 1988, hotly contested under the city’s planning laws, when 
a large private house in a fairly central suburb was found to be used as an unlicensed 
mosque and local residents, mainly Sikhs at that time, complained about this to 
the City Council. However, the Muslims, partly relying on arguments regarding 
rights to practise their religion, won this significant case and secured the right to use 
this property as a mosque, with certain conditions imposed about noise and traffic 
regulations. This house is now a very active madrasah, while two streets away, at a very 
strategic crossroads location, we now have since 2000 Masjid Umar, one of the largest 
purpose-built mosques in the city, which attracts many worshippers. This is very visible 
several times a day, especially on Fridays and festival days, as hundreds of local Muslim 
residents walk to this mosque. In fact this whole middle class neighbourhood, including 
shops and other facilities, has now become almost completely Muslim-dominated, while 
the Sikh residents have mostly moved away from this area to another part of the town.  
Such ethnographic ground-level observations about the prominent place of Islam and 
Muslims in a major European city today give rise to several important questions. Should 
one be worried about such evidence of a gradual Muslim takeover of urban spaces with 
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such high visibility, and perceive it as somewhat dangerous Islamisation of Europe? Or 
should one celebrate this as evidence of the peaceful adaptation of European Islam, 
leading us to engage in a pluralist dance of joy about the evident glocalisation and 
pluralisation of post-modern Europe? Is there a case for getting stressed out over certain 
socio-legal perspectives regarding Islam and Europeanisation, as the streets are full of 
Muslims wearing all kinds of Islamic dress, including many women with face veils? 
The Copenhagen conference in early October 2019 was a welcome occasion to 
compare notes and to discuss to what extent, in Denmark and the Nordic countries, 
there seem to be new efforts now to think about building bridges. If locally, Muslims 
are a demographic majority, are we still going to be happy to use images of bridge-
building, or should one prefer to talk about balancing acts? I do not know whether 
the British evidence is of any help in this context, for it seems to me that, wherever 
we are, everything is still possible in terms of patterns of interaction of Muslims and 
Europeanisation. Many European Muslims are clearly very modern and actively search 
for change (Barylo, 2018). While Tariq Modood (2010) has proposed that it is still not 
so easy being a Muslim in Europe, other Europeans may feel that Muslim are taking 
over entire neighbourhoods. In London, for example, there have been contentions over 
efforts to establish alcohol-free zones and private policing of certain Muslim-dominated 
neighbourhoods. 
But how does one Europeanise Islam? Does ‘the law’ really have the power it seems 
to claim? To what extent do we need to recognise and account for Islamic practices 
or actions by Muslims that appear to counteract Europeanisation, and may lead to 
forms of ethnic or religious segregation that are the opposite of bridge-building? There 
have been endless debates about this, and there is no clearly visible solution in sight. 
Therefore I could have stopped my presentation here to invite discussion. However, my 
own work (Menski, 2018a) and also Jamal (2018) suggest that much plurality-conscious 
balancing is required, and is possible to achieve bridge-building and sustainable hybrid 
outcomes for a peaceful co-existence of Muslims and other Europeans.
The law-focused methodology of flying kites as a balancing 
exercise
Much of my recent work on legal pluralism has depicted the plural entity of ‘law’ 
explicitly as a kite with four corners (Menski, 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014a, b; 2018a). I 
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see with increasing clarity that one can apply this highly dynamic model to all kinds 
of different scenarios of decision making, especially as a tool to try and understand 
the position of any ‘other’ and then to manage conflicts and competitions. The kite 
model itself is really quite simple and almost commonsensical. In essence, its depiction 
of different competing types of law reflects a kind of global legal realism, not that 
dissimilar, I suggest, from Scandinavian legal realism. The kite model incorporates what 
lawyers have been studying in different classes, yet have not been taught to relate to ‘law 
and life’, perhaps because legal scholarship has been too impressed with its own sense 
of power, rather than engaging in democratic balancing of competing and overlapping 
claims. The pluralist kite model tends to irk state-centric lawyers and aggressive human 
rights protagonists, because it reminds them that their respective favourite source of law, 
whether state law or human rights and international law, is certainly not the only source 
of legal authority and thus not the only type of law that counts in any specific context.
The basic kite structure, which should not be viewed as a square box, but indeed a kite-
like, quite subtle structure that connects the different corner points, is easily explained. 
At the top, kite corner 1 represents various forms of traditional natural law, ethics and 
values, including religion. The latter, in traditional contexts, including Islamic scenarios, 
also makes religiously-grounded claims to globalising universality and then incorporates 
major elements of corner 4 of the kite. Significantly, before the kite model became 
prominent, I developed a triangular structure of law (Menski, 2006: 612), influenced by 
the earlier teachings of Professor Masaji Chiba (1986) from Japan. Once I understood 
that Chiba’s ‘legal postulates’ as his term of art for ethics and values of all kinds included 
both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, even ‘global’ values, the kite as a four-cornered structure 
appeared. It now helps to understand why ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ values are so 
prominently engaged in hazardous clashes between old forms of natural law (which are 
not defunct) and various kinds of ‘new natural law’ (Menski, 2014b). 
Next, connected to corner 1, on the kite’s right-hand side, corner 2 signifies various 
social normativities as well as economic sustainability. On the left-hand side, kite corner 
3 represents the various familiar forms and manifestations of state law, which are often 
not made by the state, but were adopted from other sources. Lastly, kite corner 4 at the 
bottom concentrates on and depicts the new natural law of human rights and various 
forms of international law regulation, potentially a kind of new global legal positivism.
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Depicting law as a kite and analysing the operation of law as the skilful balancing of this 
kite structure in the air, and seeking to avoid crashes, has the advantage of concentrating 
the mind on several important components of this kind of game theory. This is not 
fun on the beach, but illustrates how law actually works in practice and indicates how 
boring and full of routine it may actually be to simply ensure legal stability over a long 
time. This model also tells us that law is always dependent on time, space and context. 
Therefore operating any law involves a never-ending, largely invisible sequence of 
kite-flying scenarios. We may not see the gusts of wind that push and pull the kite in 
different directions, but it is, like life itself, never static. Significantly, non-Western legal 
orders tend to internalise such basic characteristics of law and life without mortal fears 
of slipping into theocracy. Consequently, it is a core-element of non-Western approaches 
to law that one seeks to look for the justice of any particular scenario at any specific 
moment or in any given context. One does not, as we tend to do in the ‘modern’ West, 
measure justice against an existing written secular text, whether a code of law or a 
judicial decision taken to stand as precedent. The radical situation-specificity of non-
Western legal reasoning, which sees a new scenario in every split-second moment, gives 
the kite model a relentless and potentially precarious volatility. But it also empowers the 
skilled kite-flyer, in other words, the legally conscious individual as a law-related agent, 
to adjust instantly to the slightest challenges. Observing this, one constantly measures 
split-second decisions while various legal actors, silently, or with much sound and fury, 
apply this model. 
The kite structure also depicts the competing manifestations of law as irrevocably 
interconnected, so that no component could claim to be truly and fully autonomous. 
The various actors are all responsible, to some extent, for each other. This mutual 
multilateral co-ordination and agile cross-supervision not only protects the whole 
structure from the constant risk of total abuse of power and/or chaotic destruction, 
leading to a crashing kite. This requires alert individual or shared, and hence negotiated 
efforts to navigate any tensions between the various competing elements. Since it 
appears that the right balance makes a kite fly safely, the central question always remains 
what is the right balance in any particular scenario. That one may not expect total 
agreement about this is evident, in all cultures and legal orders.
In addition, the kite corners also identify four possible legal agents, who could of course 
be Muslims living in Nordic countries. In corner 1, we observe the individual agent, 
but to what extent is such a law-related actor connected to any higher authority, rather 
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than just claiming autonomy? Corner 2 is the arena of the individual agent acting as a 
member of any specific group or society, while corner 3 identifies the individual actor 
as a citizen (homo politicus), or maybe an agent of the state, a judge or a bureaucrat.  
Corner 4 signifies the individual as a global citizen (homo globalis), such as a human 
rights activist who wants to achieve change.
Globally we find that this constant four-cornered contest gives rise to only three basic 
types of state-centric legal management, and it appears that all law-related action takes 
place within that broader framework. In a Type 1 legal system, which is typical of the 
Global North, official claims are advanced that the state law is uniform and supreme. It 
is basically claimed that there is just one law for all, such as Danish law. Though there 
will be certain exceptions, these are at the discretion of the respective state authorities 
and are sought to be kept to a minimum. All Nordic countries would seem to subscribe 
to that pattern. But all Nordic countries also fall under the second type of state-centric 
legal order known to the world, which makes certain exemptions or special provisions 
for specific groups of the population that were the original owners of the land. This 
applies to the Sami in Norway, Sweden and Finland, while Danish law has specific 
exemptions for the people of Greenland and the German minority. This type of legal 
ordering is widespread throughout the world, prominently in the USA, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, but also in many countries of the Global South, notably 
more recently in Latin America with its increasing recognition of indigenous people’s 
rights. 
The third type of state-centric legal order takes the element of exemptions or special 
provisions for specific groups even more seriously and allows structural exceptions for 
different socio-cultural groups as law-related communities. Such legal orders explicitly 
recognise the co-existence of a general law, such as the country’s Constitution, common 
contract laws, procedural and evidence laws, and so on. This is then combined with 
a set of so-called ‘personal laws’ that differ from country to country and reflect the 
demographic and socio-religious realities of specific communities of citizens. So, for 
Pakistan as an Islamic Republic, there would be a majority Muslim personal law, and 
then officially recognised minority personal laws for Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis 
and Buddhists, earlier even for Jews. This type of legal order, though widely seen as 
problematic by ‘modern’ scholars, is actually the globally dominant legal arrangement. 
Hence it is no coincidence that a large number of migrants to the Nordic states who 
originate from such types of legal orders remember this pattern as part of their lived 
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legal experience. The problems we were concerned with in the Conference and related 
debates largely arise when such migrants then seek to practise ‘their’ laws in Nordic 
countries and/or may seek to pass such values, norms and processes on to subsequent 
generations, even while living  as new citizens in Nordic countries. 
This specific scenario of intercultural and plurilegal conflict is a truly global 
predicament, as law and religion always co-exist and compete. To that extent, Nordic 
countries are, I suggest, not unique, as these plurality-dominated kites exist in all legal/
religious orders and simply experience different Nordic mixities. Pluri-legal scholars will 
not be surprised about these kinds of intercultural conflicts. However, since the ‘modern 
West’ privileges secular state laws as the supreme power, and state-building processes are 
built on presumptions that citizens have given the state authority to act on their behalf, 
individual citizens are now deemed to be only indirectly, through voting rights and 
democratic representation, a law-making entity. 
However, in non-Western legal orders and worldviews, the state and its laws have 
a different role, with huge impacts also on debates about the place of Muslims in 
relation to Europeanisation. Of course, notions of state power, even a strong state, are 
also present in Islamic law and in Hindu law (Derrett, 1968). But as primarily global 
religious and legal orders, with their own polysemic terminologies for various types of 
law in the corners of their respective kites of law and life, such legal orders do not accept 
uncritically that the state power holds supreme authority. In various culture-specific 
forms, these ‘traditional’ legal orders also envisage that the individual as a law-related 
entity is connected into a giant web of wide-ranging responsibilities, as Rankin (2018) 
has recently shown for the ancient, small religious community of Jains.
Being faced with such visions of order, even of a Global Order, from which there is 
simply no escape, does not mean this completely and fatally controls all individual 
agency. But it expects and demands responsible action, now in new contexts interpreted 
as subtle forms of environmental consciousness (Rankin, 2018). Hence the legal 
traditions of Islam, Hinduism and Jainism all hold the respective state authorities 
accountable for ‘good governance’, in the sense of protecting this believed-in higher 
Order. The state, and any official office holders, then, become servants of that higher 
order, rather than holding dominant legal authority. Such a state system can still exercise 
wide-ranging powers, but there is acute awareness that somehow this is not all there is. 
Notably, people living in and under such legal orders have, in my experience, far less 
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reluctance to accept the kite model of law as a realistic depiction of the intersectionality 
of law and life.
One can also depict the four interconnected kite corners by using a different graphic 
structure, namely four overlapping circles. This further reinforces the realisation that 
all these intersecting types of laws inevitably co-exist in multiple competitions and 
mixities. This then calls for conscious, responsible action for what one may call ‘public 
interest’, rather than narrower forms of ‘private interest’. Another, somewhat deeper 
level of analysis would add power to this complex kite structure, specifically the power 
to make decisions at any moment. This slightly more complicated image depicts every 
kite corner not as an end point, but as another kite, in which again the four corners 
are present. This  results in a superdiverse ‘plurality of pluralties’, in which four types 
of power aligned to the four kite corners move into focus. Corner 1 represents now a 
set of power from within, convictions, we might say, more or less strongly held values 
and beliefs. Corner 2 denotes a set of powers shared with others, exercised as a group 
rather than individually. Corner 3 represents the power over others, either because 
one was elected or appointed to be a legal or political office holder. Significantly, in 
training programmes for judges at European level, but also in India and Bangladesh, 
as I saw, these judicial actors realise within seconds that their power derives from such 
official appointments, anchoring them to corner 3, irrespective of who or what they are 
as persons. Finally, corner 4 manifests the double whammy, as I call it, of power from 
within and power over others, most evidently displayed when human rights activists, 
but also many law teachers these days, employ structures and powers of international 
law to promote their convictions, either in various legal actions or through teaching 
processes.
One can therefore look outside and beyond the kite to select what one considers the 
right tools for navigation and balancing in any particular scenario. But it is equally 
productive, it seems to me, to look inside the kite structure and to scrutinise where 
precisely in this law-related arena any particular position or decision may be inscribed 
or located. This method has not yet been fully enough explored, but offers huge scope 
for more fruitful navigation of conflicts, and is particularly relevant in arbitration or 
adjudication contexts. The internal structure of the kite, it appears, also has many 
substructures that allow the mapping of decision-making. Here, any conflicts of law and 
religion within a pluri-legal context may be analytically interrogated in terms of their 
value as components of responsible action. 
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In this context, however, pluri-legal kite flying in modern environments such as the 
Nordic countries also runs into ideological trouble. The dominant modern state-centric 
proposition in this secular-dominated age, we are told, means that ‘religion’ is simply 
not ‘law’. Thus, it has to be the law that controls religion, and it could and must not 
be the other way around. While nobody really suggests, I think and hope, that Europe 
should ultimately be a theocracy, the above arguments privileging secular state laws risk 
rejecting any place or consideration for religion within the legal sphere. In its extreme 
form, this approach risks denying a voice to religion/culture in shaping ‘the law’ in 
any form. In kite-related language, it risks that corners 3 and 4 collude to deny any 
legal relevance to corners 1 and 2. The power kite image suggests, however, that such 
a truncated kite would crash. A total ban on any law-related input from corners 1 and 
2 is simply not feasible. This cannot be responsible action, because it also denies the 
sub-voices of corners 1 and 2 that are hidden in kite corners 3 and 4 of the power kite 
structure explained above. The highly integrated nature of the kite demands respect for 
pluri-legal alertness.
An alert kite model always needs to use all four corners and cannot, literally, cut out any 
corner, otherwise the whole entity would crash and there would be actual or perceived 
epistemic violence. Therefore, to avoid the risks of unequal and toxic contests of power, 
of denying certain connections, and ultimately of burning bridges, the kite model 
teaches several basic principles. It insists on the need to consciously cultivate knowledge 
and awareness about the key role of individual agency and of alertness about the various 
intersectionalities of law and life. It also demands that knowledge from different socio-
cultural and value-based contexts is incorporated in legal decision-making processes. 
When a Muslim in Denmark or other Nordic countries interacts with the respective 
state law, it may not be entirely irrelevant, in certain contexts more so than others, that 
the legal arena is in Europe. But the Muslim individual also has connections of various 
kinds that may extend beyond the European sphere. Expert guidance may therefore be 
needed on ‘foreign’ legal cultures, and responsible legal and religious decision making 
and skillful cultural and legal navigation are called for. 
The kite model may help in this, as a management tool, while in itself it offers no 
ready solutions. It is prescriptive only in suggesting that being diversely connected, 
and being aware of such connections, is a solid rational basis of thought and action for 
human law-related agents. The key points here are insistence, firstly, that ‘religion’ is 
not per se irrational and secondly, that as humans, we are never really alone, nor fully 
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autonomous. Muslims would have no problems with these two points, yet in developed, 
modern secular contexts, it becomes tempting to argue that what is known as 
Enlightenment prevents ‘religion’ from being a dominant power. There will then also be 
tendencies to claim that individuals should be ‘free’ to act as they wish, though in late 
modernity or post-modern perspectives, such hedonistic and potentially irresponsible 
approaches and actions would struggle to pass the test of ‘goodness’. 
Rather than theorising this further here, I suggest focus on practical aspects of the 
kite model, which stipulates that finding the right balance for responsible action is 
necessary at any moment of one’s life. This indicates attention to consciousness about 
duties rather than rights, and recognises that neither careless hedonism nor completely 
fatalistic subjugation of individual agency are likely to be conducive to responsible 
human co-existence. The challenge will therefore always be to find the right balance. 
Yet, as soon as one seeks to relate this, anywhere, to concepts of justice and equity, and 
good, stable, sustainable development and governance, different evaluations of what any 
of these desirable components and entities mean, and how they are to be achieved, will 
surface.
Having stated already that it is unwise to leave the law-related decisions only to states, 
international regulations or human rights activists, it is now necessary to examine 
the central role of individual agency and responsibility. Individual agency, whether 
anchored in kite corner 1, 2, 3 or 4, can be empowering and may help shape successful 
outcomes. Ideally all individuals should act responsibly and should strive to be the best 
they can be. But we know from bitter experience that abuses of discretion and power, 
and unrealistic dreams of domination, risk disaster and turmoil. The Danish Cartoon 
Affair of 2005 was a case in point, now replicated in France in 2020. While in 2020 
Britain’s BREXIT troubles still cause havoc and kite turbulences, earlier, the politician-
journalist Boris Johnson, presently the British Prime Minister, compared veiled Muslim 
women to bank robbers. This incited increased violence against such Muslim women 
on the streets of Britain.  Such episodes and interventions mark efforts to stir up trouble 
against ‘others’ and are hard to control if there is ill-will (Menski, 2018a: 21-22) and, 
equally dangerous, self-righteousness (Menski, 2018b: 92). If we ask how one secures a 
proper balance, it appears that the first requirement may be that one needs to know who 
one is, what one wants to achieve and why. The accompanying question, all the time, 
ought to be: ‘Is this good?’ 
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Yet my experiments with this kind of truth quickly ran aground. If a troublemaker 
thinks that his or her actions are justifiable in view of the desired aim, and thus are 
‘good’, there is no guarantee that this is good also for others. Specifically, I learnt quickly 
that relying on the popular notion of the ‘good Muslim’, even the ‘moderate Muslim’ 
(Benkin, 2017), does not help to avoid endorsing terrorist activities in the name of 
Islam. If, as experienced experts have observed, Islamist rhetoric is ‘music to the ears 
of pious Muslims’ (Benkin, 2017: 93; Menski, 2018b: 95), it does not help to adduce 
arguments by ‘liberal’ Muslims that a responsible Muslim (khalifa) should not engage 
in violence against others. If ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims continue to argue that it is part 
of their responsibility to God that the whole world should be Islamic, the ‘enlightened’ 
or ‘liberal’ response that this is a ‘wrong’ interpretation of what being a Muslim means 
most likely fails to impress those who self-righteously push for global Islamisation and 
oppose Europeanisation. 
A truly holistic ‘ecology of law’, however, reminds all voices in this contest to be truly 
‘liberal’ (Jamal, 2018). It also needs to take responsibility for avoiding, as much as 
possible, any form of suffering (Baxi, 2002:34) in efforts to promote human rights. 
While not only Buddhism teaches that life itself is suffering, responsibility in life, right 
now, but also for the future and for future generations is increasingly asked for in recent 
global environmental discourses. These, too, seek to promote conscious use of people’s 
agency as interconnected individuals and law-related entities. Everywhere, this raises 
questions about how to manage laws, in a variety of ways at different levels. But a major 
challenge remains that there is neither complete agreement over what ‘law’ or ‘Islam’ 
mean and imply. Since both are evidently highly plural entities, the scope for more or 
less violent disagreement is always latent.
The three-step approach of kite-flying
Aware of such lurking threats, I argue that using the kite flying methodology can help 
in making sense of such complexities and may offer guidance for responsible human 
action. I envisage this in three steps. Step 1 demands that any law-related actors first 
have to know and identify who or what they are and what they want to achieve. A later 
challenge will then be how to find and maintain a sustainable balance. The starting 
point of the mental kite journey thus locates and defines the identity of the law-related 
acting self. As indicated, is this legal actor simply an individual located in kite corner 1, 
with certain values, beliefs and presuppositions? Or is this individual agent operating 
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from corner 2 as a member of a social group, whether a family, a particular community 
or society, or a business? Or does this individual actor, perhaps hidden behind an 
official smokescreen of some office or function exercise choice and make decisions as a 
citizen and/or agent of a state in corner 3? Or, finally, is this law-related actor perceiving 
himself or herself as a global citizen or a representative of some global value or rule 
system? The trouble is, I suggest, that as individuals we are always all of this at the 
same time, in different kinds of mixities and roles. But like judges who have to make a 
decision and cannot say that they do not know, human kite flyers first have to make up 
their mind about their own position, preferences and ambitions. But then, immediately 
after that moment, there is a need for further decisions.
Having opted for any of the four above-mentioned possibilities, the chosen kite corner 
now becomes the location for the second step or stage of decision making. Now appears 
the power kite model, explained above, in which the sub-kite located in any of the four 
corners still contains all four competing elements. Step 2 of decision-making demands 
now that one must consider all four competing elements again to connect one’s chosen 
primary identity in some form to these other types of law, in a particular sequence. 
One cannot avoid this process, since no viable decision would be reached otherwise. As 
already stated, cutting out certain kite corners has the effect that the kite will crash. An 
individual who at this moment fails to make a decision may well cease to function. If 
someone has decided to be only a more or less autonomous ‘I’, and at the second step of 
decision making also insists on only being ‘I’, this depicts a terribly isolated individual 
with no support mechanisms or connections, and even no desire to use connectivity 
productively. Such a person risks becoming suicidal. Perhaps more dangerously, though, 
if this is a Muslim individual, insisting on an identity as a ‘good Muslim I’, perhaps 
even claiming that this is not merely a matter of individual identity, but an issue of 
global connectivity in relation to a strong worldview or belief, we face someone who is 
a religion-inspired Muslim. Co-opting corners 1 and 4, at stage 1 as well as stage 2 of 
the decision-making process and denying or rejecting any links to the other two corners, 
this individual could easily become an Islamic terrorist, or indeed someone like Anders 
Behring Breivik in Norway in 2011. It is quite evident that not only Muslims face kite-
flying challenges.
The two-step process of decision-making thus teaches three important lessons. First, 
it confirms in principle that it is impossible to deny a voice and role to any of the 
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four competing kite corner elements. No matter how much an individual may hate 
any particular pluri-legal component, it cannot simply be completely ignored and 
literally cut out of the decision-making process. Secondly, this suggests that responsible 
individual action cannot be anchored purely in belief structures, values and convictions, 
whether of a religious or secular nature, but has to connect in some form also to socio-
economic, political and legal entities and domains. Thirdly, though, this also means that 
any responsible institutional law-related action, whether on the part of a state agent or 
an international organisation, cannot completely ignore value-based elements in kite 
corner 1 and socio-cultural norms in corner 2. Responsible use of law-related agency 
thus always involves specific combinations of 1-2-3-4. Responsible actors have to handle 
the co-existence of values, norms and processes and need to record and explicitly mark 
the presence of what they do not like, as failure to do so would amount, as noted, to 
epistemic violence. In real life, human actors seem to manage this constant challenge 
quite strategically, by simply putting last what they like least, even what they hate. 
Evidently, such pluralist chain constructs result in deeply contested and conflicting 
positions. It is an entirely different debate in what ways such positioning may be 
questioned and challenged, and to what extent decision-making processes are a matter 
of basic human rights, including the right to make wrong decisions according to the 
assessment of others. The kite model allows, as indicated, other methods and strategies 
to trace and assess why and how different positions arose and then to proceed with 
efforts to harmonise specific competing or clashing perspectives and positions. One 
may see this as step 3 of the kite flying process, a kind of corrective or confirmatory 
re-balancing through negotiation of conflicts and conciliation of rival positions. Step 
3, however, requires looking inside the kite graph structure to locate specific positions 
and to map and retrace particular decision-making processes and competing positions. 
This may occur with a view to modifying any decisions made or seeking to persuade 
a competitor or any identified ‘other’ to revise their decision. The scope for such re-
balancing processes largely depends on individual discretion and on skills, and of course 
on one’s agenda, including the basic willingness to negotiate, which unfortunately we 
cannot take for granted (Menski, 2018a: 21-22).
Looking inside the kite brings more surprises, for the internal web structure of the kite 
is much more complex than we think. Dotted everywhere are four corner points of 
smaller decision-making arenas, at different levels of precision. It will help to take an 
example. Let us assume a Muslim individual in a Nordic country wants to protect his 
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or her values and religion against excessive Europeanisation. Four steps in the decision-
making process become relevant, namely A, B, C and D. As we are deling with an 
individual, the decision-making process starts in corner 1 with step A. But the issue 
would be immediately to what extent this individual would prefer to co-opt any power 
from corner 2, the family or the community. So the question becomes how far from the 
starting point in corner 1 this individual point A actually moves closer towards corner 
2 and point B. If the individual’s choice in step A would simply be to stay strictly in 
corner 1, pray to God and leave it to Him to protect Islam in the Nordic countries, 
this could be interpreted as an individual attempt to pray for theocracy. How that 
person then manages daily social and political life in the secular environment of Nordic 
countries becomes an important question.
More likely,  as individuals also need the support of broader society, a skillful 
combination and balancing of corners 1 and 2 and points A and B might result in 
specific forms of Dansk Shariat or some kind of custom (riwaj), law-related cultural 
constructs that are likely to be informal and may remain largely invisible. But they 
are possible, as Ballard (1994) convincingly showed for the UK, on the terms of the 
individuals concerned, more so if such navigation processes can be kept away from the 
potentially interventionist powers and supervision of state authorities. I am certainly 
not saying here that the Nordic states have no right to monitor what goes on in 
people’s homes. But it is a matter of realism to accept that such legal interventions 
may have limits of reach and effect or, as Degiorgis (2014) illustrates so well regarding 
unofficial mosques and ‘hidden Islam’ in Northern Italy, the state itself may choose not 
to intervene. In Britain, the home schooling of Muslim children, which the state law 
allows, is such a potentially highly relevant issue. How does one effectively monitor 
what is taught in the home? 
Whatever the precise relationship between corners 1 and 2 and the trajectory of 
decision-making between points A and B on the template of the inner kite structure, a 
Muslim in a Nordic country would probably need to cultivate all kinds of relationships 
with state agencies, and the individual’s actions need to be lawful. A skilful combination 
of corners 1, 2 and 3, and thus a movement on the decision trajectory from point 
B towards a point C in the direction of the state corner would however still permit 
individual discretion to cultivate some kind of private Dansk Shariat. Here arises the 
issue of individuals failing to register their marriages according to Nordic state laws, 
for example. Finally, to what extent such an individual Muslim co-opts a globalised or 
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Europeanised transnational corner 4 and thus moves the decision-making trajectory 
towards a point D in the direction of corner 4 would depend on many factors and 
individual circumstances. It is not suggested that the necessary endpoint has to be the 
precise centre of the kite structure as an indicator of ideal balance or ‘the right law’ 
(Menski, 2012). 
The result, it appears, would be that in all cases diligent analysis of these complex 
processes of pluri-legal conflict negotiation is possible, capturing multiple situations 
where normative pluralism and human rights tend to clash or exist in various uneasy 
relationships of tension (Menski, 2018a). As long as there is readiness to navigate and 
negotiate, there is much hope for sustainable solutions (Topidi, 2018). However, if 
there is lack of goodwill, or some kind of bad-tempered insistence on certain deemed 
or actual powers, there will be serious trouble, and there is no known insurance against 
this.
Key findings and conclusions
Responsible balancing of law and religion by people or states always involves specific 
combinations of 1-2-3-4 in the context of the kite model. Within the web of the 
immensely complex relationship of Muslims and Nordic countries, when it comes to 
the modalities and extent of Europeanisation, there is certainly a legitimate place for 
religion in European legal structures, also for minority religions. But since European 
state law and global international norms tend to view themselves as superior powers, a 
plurality-conscious analysis needs to remain sensitive to evidence of risks of enforced 
Europeanisation, which is known to have driven many Muslims away from Nordic 
countries. At the same time, there is still some room for discretion by Muslims in 
Europe to keep their identity more or less strictly Islamic, if that is what they wish to 
achieve. But there will be a price for this in the form of possibly restrictive strategic 
silences (Degiorgis, 2014), though such deliberate non-engagement may be cultivated 
by both sides. In any case, care must be taken to ensure that individual Muslims and 
non-majoritarian Muslims are not facing loss or impairment of their basic human rights 
in the name of Islam, nor in the name of Europeanisation. 
It seems unwise and is probably impossible in practice for state law to totally deny 
Muslims in Nordic countries agency and voices regarding how to manage various core 
aspects of their respective culture/tradition and religion/values. It would infringe the 
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right to freedom of religion. The state, despite overarching claims to legal supervision, 
may thus in reality have limited control over what Muslims actually do behind closed 
doors or inside their own four walls, as long as they do not infringe state law. This 
observation, however, raises highly sensitive and important public/private boundary 
issues and indicates, in overall conclusion, that all stakeholders in these law-related 
balancing acts, which seem like a high-risk yet essential strategy for both sides, Muslims 
and Nordic countries, need to remain alert and co-operative, ready to learn from each 
other. There will continue to be much need for skillful compromises along the journey. 
In the discussion after this paper, I gave the example of a highly significant, but 
unreported case involving a Muslim couple engaged in divorce in London in 2000. I 
conclude with this example here to reiterate that careful, plurality-conscious balancing 
is a crucial survival skill for all stakeholders in this never-ending kite contest. The so-
called ‘Case of the missing £1’ (Ali v. Ali, unreported, High Court in London, 2000) 
involved a Bengali Muslim man and woman who worked in the city of London and, 
already in their early thirties and quite independent personalities, agreed to get married. 
The couple had a registered marriage under English law in London as a well as a 
Muslim marriage, a nikah. Part of the Muslim marital contract was an agreement by the 
husband to pay the wife a dower (mahr) of £30.001 in case of divorce. We see here that 
this highly educated couple skillfully used all four kite corners to construct a marriage 
that would be valid under English law and under Muslim law as applied by Bengalis, in 
London and anywhere else in the world. 
However, this marriage did not last more than six months and one night, after an 
intense argument, the husband uttered an instant triple talaq and unilaterally ended the 
Muslim marriage, as he deemed to be his right. The wife was not actually opposed to 
this, yet when the husband next moved the English High Court to obtain an English 
divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, she reminded the judge that she 
was owed £30.001, claiming her religious, socio-cultural and human rights, relying 
on corners 1, 2 and 4. The husband, however, strategically insisted on the formal legal 
position that under English law, a mahr is not known and could not be implemented. 
His argument relied only on corner 3, to the exclusion of all other corners. The judge 
struggled to understand this dispute before him and probably consulted peers overnight. 
Next morning, he granted the wife £30.000, and thus deliberately kept the London-
based Muslim contract out of English law by the fictitious deduction of £1. He did not 
implement the Muslim contract, therefore, maintaining in effect the fiction that English 
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law is the same law for all. He simply made an ad-hoc equitable exemption for this 
specific woman to protect her human rights, her socio-economic entitlements, and also 
her religious principles. The kite sequence in the judicial mind might have been 3-4-2-
1. The husband’s effort to cut out corners 1, 2 and 4 to gain an unfair advantage from 
being in Europe completely failed.
I see this as a remarkably sharp and conscious pluri-legal decision, prompted perhaps 
by my expert intervention, which suggested to the judge that if he did not accept the 
woman’s claim, she would get her money through a Sharia Council in London. For the 
past two decades, in numerous highly contested cases, English judges have continuously 
been engaged in highly sophisticated kite balancing, which of course would not please 
all participants in that kind of litigation (see K v K. [2016] EWHC 3380 Fam). But 
this is what responsible governance in multi-cultural Europe is now about, too: Europe’s 
judges, in particular, are constantly called upon to find sustainable balances between 
completely contradictory positions of Muslim litigants that arise all the time when 
socio-cultural and religious elements of Islam and trends towards Europeanisation meet 
and clash. Flying kites responsibly helps in such scenarios to avoid individual tragedies 
and, possibly, avoids social unrest and disquiet. Whatever we call this highly plural 
exercise, there is little doubt that the kite flying methodology and related strategies are 
useful tools for shaping a Europeanising Islam and finding appropriate balances.
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